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Can Local Institutions  Can local  institutions  take a
lead role in reducing poverty?
Reduce Poverty?  In the past the answer would
have been an emphatic no.
Rural Decentralization  Local  institutions  have
traditionally been a blind spot
in Burkina Faso  for national  governments  and
international development
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Summary findings
Donnelly-Roark, Ouedraogo, and Ye present evidence  *  Internal participation is essential for SAMs  to
that in Burkina Faso certain high-performing local  function. Only locally anchored participation can power
institutions contribute to equitable economic  the realignments and institutional revisions needed to
development. They link reduced levels of poverty and  scale up development action.
inequality to a high degree of internal village  SAMs  and other local institutions have launched their
organization. The structure of these high-performing  communities on equitable growth paths and are reducing
local organizations means they can exist in a number of  poverty with little or no outside assistance, despite severe
African countries because they depend more on internal  resource constraints. Their impact could be enormous if
participation rather than on any one country's  cultural  external development resources augmented their
assets. The authors find that:  potential.
* Service-asset management groups (SAMs)-one  of  World Bank programs and policy interventions could
three local institutions identified in the study-have  build on local strength and make their activities more
helped to significantly reduce inequality in participating  sustainable by mapping local institutions to guide new
households. SAMs  are a fusion of long-standing  initiatives in pro-poor investment and using that
development committees and indigenous management  mapping to formalize and increase internal local
councils that collectively manage community assets such  participation-expanding  nationwide by using a network
as water. SAMs have combined the productivity goals of  of local institutions. SAMs  and other local institutions
growth with the values of equity and solidarity.  could be the vehicle for ensuring transparency and
- Current development approaches use growth  as an  accountability. Working with the results of local
initiator, assuming that surpluses will be used to benefit  activities, national policies could favor the development
the poor. SAMs and other local institutions in Burkina  of indigenously based but externally oriented local
Faso start with equity and solidarity and aim for a result  economies.
of growth  and development.
This paper-a  product of the Environment and Social Development Unit, Africa Region-is  part of a larger effort in the
region to enhance accountable poverty reduction. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Ella Hornsby, room J6-214, telephone 202-473-3375,  fax 202-473-8185,
email address ehornsby@worldbank.org,PolicV  Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org.  The authors  may be contacted  at pdonnellyroark@worldbank.org,  karimouedraoguarc@fasonet.bf,  or
xye@worldbank.org. September 2001.  (39 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Seoes disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessanily  represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countnies they represent.
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Africa RegionEXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
Results of the local level institutions (LLI) action-research study give strong evidence
that  high-performing  local  level  institutions  will  help  reduce  poverty  and  promote
equitable development. Moreover, because LLIs depend upon internalized participation
rather than any cultural  asset of any one country, these institutions can exist across  a
number of countries. Combining the qualitative and quantitative analyses, key results are
as follows.
*  Service-asset  management  groups  (SAMs)-one  of  three  identified  local  level
institutions-have  been significant in lowering inequality. The quantitative analysis
indicates  that  SAMs  are  linked  with  lower  levels  of  inequality  among  LLI
participating households, statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
*  SAMs  are  a  fusion  of  long-standing  development  committees  and  indigenous
management  councils  that  collectively  manage  community  assets.  SAMs  have
combined the  productivity goals of growth with the  societal values of equity and
solidarity.
*  Internalized participation is essential for SAMs to function. Evidently, only this kind
of  locally  anchored  participation  can  power  the  re-alignments  and  institutional
revisions needed to scale-up development action.
This means that LLI/SAMs have launched their communities on an equitable growth
path, and are reducing poverty with little or no outside assistance-  all  of this  despite
severe resource constraints. Clearly, if external development resources can augment this
internal initiative and direction, the future impact can be enormous.
Key differences  and implications
LLI/SAMs  differ  in  their  approach on  how to  reduce poverty.  Current  development
approaches use growth as a critical initiator, and assume that  surpluses will be used to
benefit the poor, thereby creating greater equity. SAM/ LLIs, on the other hand, reorder
things to match both their values and resource constraints-  that is, solidarity and equity
are the starting point, development and growth are the result.
Recommendations  for program  and policy  interventions
The study suggests a three-step program package and a two-step policy  package. Recent
institutional  changes  in  the  World  Bank-Comprehensive  Development  Framework
(CDF), Community Driven Development (CDD), and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP)-provide  a base for these initiatives.
The program package includes the following:
*  Use LLI institutional mapping to guide new initiatives in  pro-poor investment.
*  Use LLI  mapping to formalize  and  increase internalized participation  to  quickly
attain national coverage.
*  Use the LLI internalframework  to guarantee long-term sustainabilityfor  community
driven development and rural decentralization.The policy package focuses on two initiatives:
*  Working from  LLI  results,  link  PRSP  participatory  monitoring  strategies  to
LLI/SAMs  for  accountability and transparency.
*  Working from  LLI  results,  create  national  policies  that favor  development  of
indigenously based, but externally-oriented local economies.
If  the  LLI  results  are  widely  disseminated-including  to  local  communities,
governments,  and  donor  organizations-obstacles  will  dissolve and  internal  capacity
expansion should surge. When this happens, African rural decentralization models across
the  continent  will  be  re-invented to  utilize  the  indigenous  strengths  of  local  level
institutions and their values of equity and solidarity. Even more important, the expanding
use of LLIs will spark modern but indigenous development institutions across Africa that
reduce poverty and enhance equitable growth.TABLE  OF CONTENTS
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The role of local  level institutions  in development
Can local level institutions (LLI) take a lead role in reducing poverty and enhancing
equitable prosperity? If past perspectives are any guide, the answer is an emphatic no.
Traditionally, LLIs have been a blind spot for  international development agencies and
national governments. Aid, when it moves out of the capital city, normally goes directly
to local communities or local governments, with no stops in between. This route ignores
the  endogenous  weave  of  local  institutions  that  traditionally  encircle  and  support
communities. The reason for this is that  LLIs, like institutions everywhere, are complex
and multi-faceted, presenting problems for time-bound development projects.
But  now  that  decentralized  governments  are being  urged  to  join  rural  people  in
creating sustainable and  accountable local development, LLI institutions  are being re-
evaluated,  regardless  of their  complexities,  and  even being  discussed as  strategic to
development. However, the questions remain: do LLIs contribute to poverty  reduction
and equitable growth, and if so, how?
Burkina Faso is one country ready to respond to these questions and capitalize on its
own  internal resources. The country has  a long history of informally recognizing  and
including  its  local  level institutions  in  both governance  and  development. Now,  the
recently passed national Decentralization Law of 1998 formally recognizes LLIs as the
base of rural development. In other words, the Burkina Faso decentralization  decision
allows explotation  of what African decentralization and rural development models  will
look like if they are re-invented with an eye to indigenous institutional strengths, rather
than the institutional weakness of external transplants.
This  paper  presents  sociological  evidence  that,  in  Burkina  Faso,  certain  high
performing  local  level  institutions  contribute  to  equitable  economic  development.
Economic findings  support this,  showing that  both lower  inequality  levels  and lower
poverty  levels  are  linked  to  a  high  degree of  internal  village  organization.  Equally
important, the actual structure of these high-performing  LLIs means that they can exist
across a number of African countries. Our analysis shows that these local level institution
depend  more  upon  internalized participation  than  any  societal  structure  or  cultural
element. We hope that this study will spur a wider effort to understand and include local
level institutions in development activities in other African countries.
Decentralization  Burkinabe  style
Burkina  Faso  has  embarked  upon  a  unique  endeavor.  The  new  national
Decentralization Law, passed in August  1998, goes beyond the normal parameters of
rural  decentralization  to  involve  rural  indigenous  institutions  more  formally.  The
government, under the leadership of its appointed National Decentralization Commission
(CND), has realized that, for the rural decentralization process to promote equitable but
growth-oriented  development  over  the  long-term,  it  must  include  the  aspirations,
capacities, and institutions of the majority rural population.
Specifically,  the  new  Decentralization  Law  allows  groups  of  villages  to  come
together,  federate themselves  as one  entity if they  wish,  and then  request Commune
Rurale or district status from the government. This is a complete reversal of the usual
process where a government delineates the boundaries of a Commune rurale, and then
allows individual constituents to help select its leaders. In addition, the new law includes
Ianother  mechanism-the  Groupement  d'interet  public  (GIP). It  provides  legal
recognition to any local, federative, or community-based group that applies for it. This
will  allow many local groups-such  as parent-school associations or natural resource
management  councils-to  enter  into  contracts  and  function  as  legally  recognized
entities.'
With  this  decision,  Burkina  Faso  now  balances  a  two-sided  approach  to
decentralization. On the rural side they have offered credibility and inclusion toLLIs. On
the urban  and peri-urban  side, they  have adopted a  Western institutional approach  to
decentralization, featuring administrative deconcentration and political elections. 2
There are four categories of stakeholder agendas for decentralization: 1) government's
national administration agencies; 2) civil society andNGOs;  3) national political parties
and their participants;  and 4) donors. Before  the law's  passage, the key  division  was
between those that  preferred administrative decentralization  and those that  supported
rural  development decentralization.  Over  the  first  several years,  ministries  and  their
leaders were the key players, and initially divided along these lines. Those that preferred
macro-economic growth measures and government-planned sectoral initiatives opted for
the administrative decentralization model; those working on issues of endogenous growth
and sector service provision leaned toward the rural development decentralization model.
Political  parties  currently  balance  a  dual  agenda.  The  "administrative
decentralization" agenda originally held the greatest appeal for political parties because
expansion of party politics and elections to rural as well as urban communes would have
expanded their power-base beyond the urban areas. However, the government has also
attracted high levels of political support through the creation and backing of CND, with
its strong advocacy for the "rural development decentralization" model. Finally, donors
have  essentially divided,  with some supporting one  model, and others  supporting the
other.
With  the  passage  of the  Decentralization  Law, support  of  the  rural  development
orientation is assured, but covert efforts to destabilize the full implementation of rural
decentralization  process should also be expected. Here, donors who were  once minor
players  may  become  more  important,  since  they  could  undermine  the  Law's
implementation by supporting those that prefer the administrative model.
In sum, the Burkinabe process  gives rural people the opportunity to  integrate their
local  level  institutions  into  the  legal,  economic,  and  administrative  framework  of
decentralization. This is a prerequisite to moving rural people from beneficiary to partner
status  in  locally  based  development.  Working as partners  means  that  decisions  and
strategies adopted are agreed to within a shared set of cultural values. While the values of
equity, solidarity, and consensus-oriented decision-making are still a real, if sometimes
1 With the approval of the new Decentralization Law, the existing administrative framework has changed
substantively.  Formerly  there  were  10  regions,  45  provinces,  322  departments  with  their  township
communes, and 8,000 rural villages. Of the 322  communes, 220 were  described as  rural. The new law
specifies 12 regions rather than  10, and defines the maximum number of communes as up to, but not more
than, 500. This commune expansion will not be completed, however, until 2010. (It  is interesting that the
number of departments was already at 300 under the Lamizana era of the 1970s, and has remained steady
since then.)
2 Between 1991 and 1992 a national apparatus for representational democracy was developed, culminating in
presidential  and  National  Assembly  elections.  From  1993 to  1994 judicial  teams  developed  the  first
component  of  the Decentralization  Law under  which the administrative  and political  interactions  were
defined for the Urban Communes. Consequent to this initial definition, local elections were held at the Urban
Commune level for the office(s) of mayor and council representative for the 30 original provinces and the
two major cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso.
2hidden, part of  the  national  landscape, at  the  local level these  values  still  shape  the
institutional environment. The intent of the government leaders (evidently for reasons of
regime stability) that these values be part of the decentralized organizational environment
attests to their strength and endurance.
Defining  local  level institutions
We must  first understand what local level institutions are, and  what they  are not.
Contextually, LLIs surround and connect communities. As institutions they (or the people
active within them) establish the rules within specific geographical and cultural  spaces,
and interact with other institutional systems, such as local government. In some instances,
LLIs  expand  their  institutional  connections to  key  groups  at  the  national  level  and
beyond. Because local level institutions create the rules by which organizations operate
and  interact, LLIs become over time, the repository of indigenous knowledge systems
and the foundation by which local society organizes itself.  These rules are continually
and dynamically updated, sometimes in diverse and contested ways.
Local level institutions incorporate many different kinds of indigenous organizations
and functions. These include: village level governance; accepted methods of community
resource  mobilization;  social  and  mutual  aid  societies;  security  arrangements;  asset
management; conflict resolution councils; management committees for infrastructure and
sector services; conflict  and  legal adjudication committees;  livestock  and  agricultural
production cooperatives; tontines and savings federations; religious associations; music
societies; and lineage organizations, among others.
If local level institutions are the key players in development, as some have insisted,
this  recognition would complete a thirty-year transition period within the  international
development community. This recognition and transition began with the discovery in the
early  1970s that external blueprint approaches to social and economic development did
not  work,  and  more  participatory  processes were  needed.'  The  transition  continued
through the  1980s with the  growing understanding of the relationship  between project
sustainability, ownership, and community participation. 4 In the early 1990s, the definition
of  a  disconnect  between  indigenous  and  transplanted  institutions  underscored,
particularly for Africa, that current economic development strategies were only tapping
into a small proportion of working institutions within a country.' Now, if this recognition
is to come to fruition, development responsibility must be internalized within national
and local institutions. But the big question remains: are local level institutions really the
best vehicle for reducing poverty and enhancing growth? And if they are, how can their
resources be expanded and linked to national policies?
Objectives  and analytical  frameworks
The basic objective of this  study is to understand how LLIs function within local
societies-namely,  if  and  how  they  contribute  to  poverty  reduction  and  equitable
development. Each of the three partner groups within the research team held specific yet
complementary  goals. The lead partner, the National  Decentralization Commission  of
Burkina Faso (CND), focused on  identifying local institutions below local government




3Bank Social Development Network used the Burkina Faso research initiative in a three-
country comparative study (including Indonesia and Bolivia) to  learn if, and how, LLIs
contribute to poverty eradication through generating social capital. More specific to the
Africa  Region,  this  report  tries  to  analyze  the  Government  of  Burkina  Faso's  LLI
approach to rural decentralization and poverty reduction, in order to guide future Bank
support.
The construction of the LLI analytical framework begins with the concept of social
capital. Although  there  is no  consensus definition, the  central  idea  is that  economic
outcomes vary  according to  social  norms, relationships,  and  networks.  One popular
analytical approach aims to assess the contribution of social capital to economic welfare,
as measured by  per  capita consumption  expenditure. For example,  the  three-country
comparative study mentioned above uses this approach and concludes that, in Burkina
Faso, social capital has positive effects on household welfare, and that social capital can
significantly reduce the probability of being poor  6 These results validate the importance
of social capital, and promote strategies to include poor households in local associations.
But questions remain about how social capital really works. Do some patterns contribute
more than others to poverty reduction? If so, are there ways to nurture and expand these
endogenous resources?
Results from  prior research in Burkina Faso must be considered.  The best-known
social science research finds that societal values of equity and solidarity are reflected in
the  everyday  lives of the Burkinabe people. Noted  historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo  (1963)
explains  that  while  the  Mossi  (the  major  ethnic  group)  have  constructed  a  highly
centralized  governance structure over the  past  three  centuries, the Mossi  maintain  it
through participation  and  solidarity creating  strong cohesion at  the  community  level.
David Reisman (1978), in his well-known book Yatenga, explores the mechanisms by
which solidarity and equity are practiced within a Mossi centralized governance system.
More recently, anthropologist Alan Fisk (1991) emphasizes that the Mossi preference for
communal sharing does not seem to  be driven by utility-maximization constraints, but
that "their paramount goals concern mutual solidarity, a sense of common identity, and
belonging,  unity,  and  kindness"  (p.268).  These societal  values are  particularly  well-
defined in Burkina Faso but, according to many scholars, also traditionally exist across
Africa.
Because Burkina Faso has this strong preference for mutual or collective social action
in addition to  their  more  individualized  household pursuits,  we  have  constructed  an
analytical  framework that  features  both.  Quantitatively, we  continue  to  measure  the
contribution  of  social  capital  to  individual  and  household  welfare  by  per-capita
consumption  expenditure.  But  in  addition,  we  assess  collective  social  capital  by
inequality measures.
Qualitatively, one question emerges: how, or if, culture and values are incorporated
into  economic  development?  In  other  words,  is  a  certain  level  of  minimal cultural
coherence necessary for success in economic development? For this coherence analysis
we  use  Norman  Uphoff s  (1998)  notion  of  how  cognitive  social  capital  becomes
functional.
This  question  creates  an  analytical  framework  that  targets  not  only  relatively
unexplored  cultural  aspects,  but  also  a  hidden  assumption  of  current  economic
development  and  social  capital  theories.  Our  LLI  analytical  framework  asks-
realistically  we  believe-whether  successful economic  development  always  depends
upon  the  primacy  of  the  utilitarian  growth  model,  as  measured  by  income  and
6Grootaert,  Oh,  and  Swamy,  1999,  p.24
4expenditure.  Or,  might there  not be  an equally effective relational  growth  mode  as
measured primarily by inequality, emphasizing the societal value placed on inclusion and
the social group? In the 1970s well-known economist Kenneth Boulding wrote about the
unacknowledged  economies  of  affection  that  underlie  our  Western  economies.  Is  it
possible that all societies combine utilitarian and relational aspects of growth in a mix
that fits their own cultural realities? If so what impact would this have on the theory and
practice of economic and social development?
Survey  methodology  and  data  sets
The data set for this paper comes from the local level institutions study, and is shared
with the comparative studies of three countries (Burkina Faso, Bolivia, and Indonesia) as
noted  above. The Burkina Faso LLI data  set features surveys in 48  villages and  959
households  within four  provinces. The provinces of Yatenga and  Sanmatenga  in the
North, Houet in the Southwest, and Sissili in the Southeast were selected because they
represent the variations found nationally in social organization, climate/environment, and
the  type  and  level of  natural resources available  for production. In each  province, a
department was randomly selected for  implementation of the  LLI research. The only
stipulation of the random selection process was that it be selected from rural as opposed
to  township departments. Selection of the villages within the selected department was
also random, and within each of the 48 villages, 20 households were randomly selected to
take part in the quantitative Household Survey
The LLI field research took place in March-May,  1997. To begin, officials at the
provincial level were interviewed to obtain information on community services, internal
organization, economic standing, and heterogeneity. Rural leaders were then interviewed
to discuss their views on development, poverty reduction, and decentralization. For the
qualitative  village  analysis,  a  participatory  diagnostic  called  Methode  Active  de
Recherches Participatives  (MARP) in the local language was used. The MARP process
takes  about three  days to complete  in the village  and includes  all  factions  (notables,
women, youth, farmers, etc.) in a participatory analysis of what's  working in terms of
institutions, organizations, and services for economic development and poverty reduction.
The MARP also emphasized history and resource analysis. After completing the MARP,
a  quantitative  Household  Survey was  carried  out by  the  same  team  with  randomly
selected households in each of the communities.
S2.  LOCAL  LEVEL  INSTITUTIONS  FROM  THE  GROUND  UP
Rural  people  in  Burkina  Faso  have  certain  expectations  of  their  institutions,
organizations, and leaders. To understand both the expectations and constraints through
the eyes of local people-and  analyze the role institutions play-four  national research
teams using local languages undertook participatory action-research with residents in 48
villages in four provinces.  In each of the villages, the  teams first  did a  participatory
analysis of LLIs with the community, and then began household surveys with community
members. A  brief description  of the four provinces, rural leader perspectives on  rural
decentralization, and how institutions work in each of the provinces, offers a base for the
qualitative and quantitative analyses in the following chapters.7
Painting in the landscape
Changes brought about by development activities over the past 20 years are apparent
within the four provinces. Burkina Faso, rebuilt from the effects of a two-decade  long
drought in the  1960s and  1970s, looks relatively prosperous. The Province of Yatenga
(which borders Mali) once had drought-scorched fields, but, over the years, the farmers
themselves have recovered large plats of fields. Now, even when the dry season moves
in,  a  faint tinge  of  green remains  because of the  use of  low-tech  indigenous water
retention  methods.  In Sanmatenga  Province,  also  in the  North,  the  government  and
communities  have, over the last 20 years, built a series of small dams and  lakes that
diminish the suffering caused by smaller rotating droughts, which appear every four to
eight years.
In the  southern  Province of Houet  bordering  Ghana, the  rolling  green  landscape
-billed  20  years  ago  as  the  future  "granary"  of Burkina  Faso-has  now  actually
achieved that status. The southern Province of Sissili, located in the harsh new green of
the savannah forest was unoccupied for years because of the scourge of river-blindness.
But since oncho is now a disease of the past, the province is host to migrants seeking
more fertile lands.  Despite these achievements, Burkina Faso remains one of the most
materially poor and natural resource-deprived countries in the world, listed 174 according
to UNDP's Human Development Report, 1999.
The  four provinces  selected  by  the  LLI action-research for  their  strong variation
-social  organization, climate/environment status, and productive economy-mirror  the
diversity of the country. Yatenga and Sanmatenga provinces in the north have relatively
high population density, are predominantly Mossi-the  majority ethnic group in Burkina
Faso-and  are  primarily  Muslim.  Mossi  social  organization  is  hierarchical  in  its
institutional  structures, but fairly flexible in  its everyday community decision-making.
The Peuhl are the minority, but make distinct contributions. Both provinces rely on cereal
farming for subsistence and market, and Yatenga is also active in livestock raising. Both
also routinely suffer serious nutritional short-falls when the rain is scarce.
Houet and  Sissili  in the  South have  lower population densities and bring  together
several ethnic  groups-Bobo,  Bwaba,  and  Senefou  in  Houet,  and  the  Gourounsi  in
7The  information in this chapter is from five sources that make up the LLI research in Burkina Faso done by
the  National  Decentralization  Commission  (CND):  1) Decentralisation  Rurales  et  Institutions  Locales:
Rapport Synthese  by  Karim Ouedraogo, principal  investigator,  1999; 2)  Cas du  Sanmatenga,  Mathieu
Ouedraogo et al., 1997; 3) Cas de la Sissili, Mahamadi Negie et al., 1997; 4) Cas du Houet, Sidiki Boro et al.,
1997; 5) Cas du Yatenga, Issiaka Sawadogo et al.,  1997.
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fairly even mix of Muslim, Christian, and Animist religions. Higher rainfall allows both
provinces to produce cotton and many other export crops. Many Mossi farmers and Peul
livestock  herders  immigrate from the  northern provinces, increasing the already  high
levels of cultural diversity in both provinces.
The 48 villages included in the LLI study, like the rest of the country's  8,000 villages,
depend upon chieftancy institutions for local governance. Each community is headed by a
chef de village. However, the chief's main responsibility now is village  administration;
powers  previously held  in other  areas are waning (unless the  community  recognizes
certain areas of competency). For example, an association of several groups of villages
recently asserted that the village  chief had no role in creating their organization.  This
kind  of assertion would have  been unheard of 20  years ago. Apparently, times  have
changed for these leaders -some  chiefs are accorded respect, while others are only seen
as an administrator of the state.
The chef de terre, on the other hand, who is responsible for the religious and sacred
rites of lineage and land, always enjoys a strong position of honor and legitimacy. Each
ethnic  group  names  this  position  differently,  but  this  chief  has  the  same  sacred
responsibilities  for  each community. Major  differences exist  between the hierarchical
Mossi and the other ethnic groups with more decentralized communal leadership in how
the responsibilities  are carried out. But the responsibilities and the stature remain the
same.
Rural leader perspectives
The National Decentralization Commission (CND) has hosted numerous consultations
in  all  parts  of the  country to  learn what  rural  leaders and  people expect  from  rural
decentralization. By the time the LLI study team hit the field (March-April,  1997), some
consensus  around  key  subjects had  begun to  emerge.  Two  ideas  in  particular  were
emphasized: 1) the new dynamics for partnerships between local and national levels; and
2) what roles local institutions can play.
Apparently,  rural  leaders'  willingness  to  partner  with  national  government  has
changed. In the past the government's attempt to involve itself in the concerns of rural
people met with little success  -the  result was described as "steadfast resistance" on the
part of local people. So, the idea that inter-dependent efforts for  development will not
only be  tolerated,  but tentatively  welcomed for  rural  decentralization  is  clearly  new
thinking  on  the  part  of  rural  people.  Reformulation of chieftancy  roles  as  part  of
decentralization,  new levels  of confidence in their own  internal capacity, and  the  re-
migration  of  community  members  returning  with  increased  financial  resources  and
technical know-how, all seem to be part of the new dynamics at the local level.
Chieftancy roles in terms of conflict dispute, village advisor, and lineage leadership
remain incontrovertible, but decisions on how to go forward with social and economic
development has become more widely shared.
The complaints we have made about certain actions committed by government agents
are  obvious. But  if they mean  to give  us the responsibility for  organizing  such a
community (e.g., creating a  Commune Rurale among several  existing villages), we
would  take  it seriously  to ensure success. And  the fruits  would  benefit  the  whole
community.  For  example, three  or four  years  ago,  Toussiana became  a pilot for
decentralization  where  several  groups  participated  in  its  management  (our  own
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this is only possible because the management is no longer  from  a single source-  the
chief. Decentralization is therefore an opportunityfor us.
Rural  Leader  from  Houet  Province.
These new dynamics allow local people to explore  new methods of initiating  local
economic and socio-political development; but the local level institutions remain as the
base. Although many in the international development community would like to think
that political and economic liberalization are making their mark at the local level, nothing
confirms this. In fact, the observation about competitive elections quoted below seems to
represent a strong majority opinion across provinces.
In the 40 years since independence, elections have continually torn our country-side
apart,  and the scars left  by the  injuries are slowly breaking down  social  bonds.
Because of this, it is important to avoid making the same mistakes we made  in the
past:  'to vote with a raised hand or aligning oneself behind a candidate, or even
using propaganda to get elected'.
Rural  Leader  from  Sanmatenga  Province
Local institutions  are not being marginalized by the new dynamics, but instead are
playing an important role in modernization. But being dynamic and flexible doesn't mean
that these institutions are in transition from one set of values to another. The awareness of
networks that include all groups remains key to rural participants. Even when considering
how  rural  decentralization  should be organized, it seems  that the  relational  network,
featuring social negotiation, is essential to bringing about future improvements.
We don't see how a little village can become a commune rurale-with  the exception
of big villages like Ziga. We would prefer  that all villages be able to develop more
agreements  among  themselves  by exploiting the  relational  network  that  already
exists and allows them to survive.
Rural  Leader  from  Yatenga  Province
Rural leaders and local people continue to search for new solutions. But dependency
upon erratic weather cycles makes material  poverty just  a growing season away,  and,
under  these  circumstances,  providing  for  basic  health,  education,  and  food  security
remains very difficult.
It  doesn't  rain  enough anymore... Profits  are  limited, and faced  with family  daily
expenses  we  are  obliged  to  sell  the  crops  to  satisfy  our  basic  needs.  But  then
unfortunately,  we sometimes  buy  back at  a  higher price  later  on.. It  is  a  vicious
circle... we don 't know how we are going to manage.
Farmer  Participant
In this environment hope is a real, if intangible resource. And there does seem to be
hope that locally based rural decentralization could make a difference.
8Decentralization could improve our living conditions by creating new services that




Situated  in  the  central  north  on  the Mossi  Plateau, Sanmatenga  Province  has  a
population of 469,684 people, with 68,897 households. The province has 11 departments
and 339 villages. The population is 90 percent rural (estimated  by INSD), 90 percent
illiterate, and 51 percent of its people are less than 15 years old. The province is home to
two ethnic groups-the  predominant Mossi and the pastoral Peuhl. Sanmatenga Province
spans  two  agro-climatic  areas,  with  farmers  in  the  southern  areas  (700  mm  of
precipitation  per  year),  and  agro-pastoralists  in  the  northern  area  (500  mm  of
precipitation). All areas experience widely variable rainfall. The dry season lasts for eight
months from October to May, with the rainy season from June to September. When the
rains come, everything is verdant if not lush, so it looks as though life must be easier than
during the harsh and hot dry season. But this time is also known as the hungry season-
last year's  harvest is often already consumed, but the new harvest will not be ready until
October.
Local level institutions in Sanmatenga weave a dense web of organizational activities
and process rarely recognized by outsiders. The 12 villages in the LLI study have a total
of 34 local organizations (24 mixed gender; 7 for women; and 3 for men). Most of these
village organizations have strong supra-village ties also. The majority have links to either
local/regional civil-society federative organizations, or supportingNGOs,  located at the
department level. According to the Venn organizational analyses undertaken with each
village  by  the  LLI  researchers, there  is considerable overlap  for  consensus building
among the organizations of the village-with  each other and with their local chieftancy
institutions.
Interestingly  enough,  each  of  the  twelve  villages  has  designated  one  of  these
organizations to be the institution responsible foraction-research within the village. This
serves as a strong, even remarkable, indicator as to how serious the rural people are about
their  community development  and  management.  The idea  itself  evolved  out  of  the
participatory debates originally sponsored by FEER (Fonds de 1'eau et de 1'Equipment
Rural).  Village people said that  action-research emphasizes the same  importance that
they place on working collaboratively within the villages as well  as with their external
partners. Identified collaborative priorities include three areas: 1) agriculture (agricultural
credit and initiatives); 2) education ( primary schools and literacy centers) and 3) water
provision (boreholes and modem wide-diameter wells [SA.Case Study: p.61]).
Twenty "Management Committees" are also active (11 for water points; 7 for schools;
and 2 for  CSPS health centers). Each  of these committees'  members  and officers  are
elected either by  consensus or competitive vote  and serve for two to three years.  The
committees themselves (unlike other local organizations) are usually stand-alone groups.
But  members  serving on  committees are  also  involved  in several  of the  other  local
organizations,  which  allows  information to  flow  without unnecessary  meetings.  This
management  committee  structure, while  focused  on  maintaining  the  existing  sector-
service  infrastructure,  is  also  a  key  advocate for  development  planning  and  further
investment.
Institutional development in Sanmatenga featured some early external contributors.
This  has  substantially  strengthened the  style  of organization  and  institution that  has
evolved. In the early  1970s, two organizations from outside the province began activities
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specializes in providing water and rural infrastructure, and the other was ADRK, an NGO
from the locally based Catholic Diocese of Kaya. ADRK began in 1972, specializing in
institutionalized financial assistance for rural initiatives. By  1978, the peasants active in
ADRK had set up their own savings and credit sections. According to rural groups, using
credit was the bridge for their setting up of a larger rural finance system
FEER began its work in 1970 with an evolving strategy that placed local people at the
center of "debates" to discuss how they themselves could achieve local development. It
also  focused  on  assuring  that  the  local  residents  were  responsible  for  whatever
development initiatives were decided upon. Currently, both FEER and ADRK, along with
other federative groups, function as partners of local level organizations and institutions.
Now, even  new external projects that  focus  on community management of resources
(gestion terroir) have also adopted this multi-sector participatory approach.
Yatenga  Province
Located in the far north of Burkina Faso, Yatenga Province is 181 km from the capital of
Ouagadougou and  is known  as the  traditional seat of the Mossi Kingdom.  It  has  a
population of 443,935 inhabitants. Twelve percent are urban, since the  capital of the
province, Ouayagouya, is a major provincial trading and commercial center. Yatenga is
within the Sahelian plains area, with approximately 30 percent of its soil suitable for
farming. Rainfall ranges between 400 to 700 mm of rain per year, and the unpredictable
fluctuation of rainfall poses critical problems for farmers. Villages in the province are
divided according to ethnic group, rather than mixed. In the LLI study area, nine villages
are Mossi, one Peuhl, one Silmi Mossi, and one village Yarse. Both ethnic and religious
relations (Islam,  Animist, Catholic,  and Protestant) are described as cordial  and non-
conflictual.
Local level  institutions in Yatenga  are plentiful and diverse,  but LLI researchers
found that often they were isolated and competitive. The 12 LLI Yatenga villages in the
study have a total of 45 local organizations. There are two kinds of organizations which
overshadow the others  within the village -the  Groupement  Villagoise (GV)  and  the
Groupement Naam (GN). GV are found in 10 of the 12 villages, while GN are found in
11  of  the  12.  Groupements Villageois  is  a  nationwide  organization  begun  by  the
government in the  1970s in its first efforts to decentralize. Now, many of the groups
consider themselves  to be community rather than state initiated, but all groups  remain
strongly tied to state intervention and resources. Indeed, a major reason to join  is to have
better  access to the resources offered by the state. The original GV  excluded women,
youth, and livestock herders. But over the years the excluded groups have organized their
own organizations, and now 53 percent of the GVs are gender-mixed.
Groupement Naam,  on the  other hand, was started in the  early  1970s by  a  well-
respected  leader  who now  serves both  as Mayor of Ouahigouya  and  in the National
Assembly.  Bernard  Ledea  Ouedraogo's  intent  in  organizing  GN  was  to  incorporate
traditional cultural methods for performing village service (Naam) into a  federation of
organizations  to  expand  community  prosperity.  With  its  home  base  in  Yatenga,
Groupements Naam now consists of 73 federative unions comprising 4,721 groups at the
local village level in 18 of the 45 provinces (Final Report, p. 112).
One  of Naam's  changes has  been  to  incorporate the  village  chief  as  one  of  its
members,  but as  one  with  no  more  power  than  any  other  member.  It  is  debatable,
however, whether this has had the intended effect. Researchers noted that none of the 12
LLI villages now had strong leadership despite the fact that an administrator and a village
chief  resided  in each  village.  A  conseil des  anciens  now  has  the  responsibility  for
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LLI  respondent,  in  Yatenga, contrary  to  the  findings in Sanmatenga, the  chieftancy
institution was not thought essential to development.
A third organization, found in the rather large village of Ziga, has impact at the village
level as the only institution to offer opportunities for both credit and savings. The Union
Regionale des Caisses Populaire  (URCP) has within the village  1,300 accounts with a
total savings of 34,000,000 CFA, ($68,000) and a total of 15,000,000 ($30,000) current
loans, mainly for the residents of Ziga itself. The average loan (used by  150 people) is for
100,000 CFA ($200) and has a default rate of only I percent. Savings accounts, which are
more  popular (and  easier to get),  number  1300 (Yatenga Case Study, p.17).  Overall,
URCP  and  its federation  currently  covers 21  provinces with  62  bank offices  at  the
department level, and 1,022 smaller offices at the village level. It has  138,000 member
who together mobilize savings and credit (Final Report, p.61).
Institutional  development  processes  have  been  a  constant  theme  in  Yatenga
Province. Almost all the local institution members spoke of their unity, solidarity, and
acquisition of new learning as key components of their group success. Even if not yet
successful in reaching their objective, they felt that their unity and  solidarity would be
key to its eventual arrival. When reviewing their obstacles, members believed that a lack
of  financial  capital  was  the  primary  reason  for  ineffective  action.  However,  LLI
researchers noted that there was also a notable absence of collaboration among the local
organizations  in Yatenga,  even within  the  same village.  For example,  there  was no
coordination between Groupements Villageois and Groupements Naam even though both
groups were often undertaking similar projects in the village, usually with external state
or NGO partners. At the same time, each of the groups tended to be exclusive in their
membership patterns. In fact, researchers noted several village groups creating more than
one organization with the same people to solve the same problem. This was explained as
necessary because "each outside partner wanted their own groupement" (Yatenga Case
Study, p.34).
Evidently, there is little effort to hold consultative councils among groups within the
village  and  within the department  as does Sanmatenga. Several groups  thought these
were needed additions-with  the aim of creating some sort of community understanding
and consensus around priorities.
But asked if things were better now than before, one groupement response seemed
typical. They answered yes, things are better "because the village has a school, a health
dispensary, and two cereal banks" (p.48). On the other hand, asked if things would be
better in the future, many expressed fear given the "difficult climatic conditions" paired
with "increasingly difficult economic times." The definition of what comprises "difficult
economic  times"  seems  key  here. Groupements constantly referred  to  the  increased
difficulty and  competition in finding outside partners to assist. Evidently, theYatenga
style of federation, with few resources outside their own solidarity, has brought in many
outside  partners to  assist  in development. But as internal needs  increase,  and outside
resources remain the same, a competitive spiral among groups seems to have emerged.
Despite  their  success,  the groupements  are  expressing a  pessimism  that  is  new  and
worrisome.
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Sissili Province  is situated  in the south,  bordering  Ghana,  approximately  165 km from the
capital of Ouagadougou.  The climate is high forest savannah  and has 800-1200 mm of
precipitation  per year, making it one of the more fertile areas of the country. The dry
season lasts from October  to April, a little shorter  than the provinces  to the north. The
province  suffers  one of the greater infrastructure  deficits  in the country,  possibly  because
river-blindness  has only recently  been  eliminated  from its most fertile  areas.  For example,
the roads  that connect  the provincial  capital  of Leo to all of its departments  are not paved,
effectively  cutting off internal  communication  for a good part of the rainy season. The
principal  ethnic groups  are the Gourounsi  Nuni and the Wala who are indigenous  to the
area, and the Mossis  and the Peuls who are more recent newcomers.  Although  the Nuni
and Wala are the indigenous  groups,  the Mossi  are now  the majority  within  the province.
Local level institutions in Sissili Province are neither as organized nor as inter-
connected  as those surveyed in the north, but there does seem to  be an emerging
willingness  to collaborate  at all levels.  For example,  capacity  for resource  mobilization,
always a good indicator  of the trust and confidence  in local governance,  is high. For
successful  mobilization  of funds, there must be a consensus  within the group on each
action that resources are meant to serve-and,  evidently,  communities  can consistently
achieve  this. Resource  mobilization  is accomplished  through  local  chieftancy  institutions
and therefore  usually  brings  together  several  villages,  or parts of villages.
The education  sector  has also begun  to see some collaboration  and participation.  Here,
LLI researchers  observe that parent-student  "consultation  and co-management  with the
teaching personnel is usually done with bonheur." Moving from the village level to
collaboration  with local government,  there are other  positive  signs.  Elders  have supported
the creation of councils that promote greater collaboration  with both NGOs and state
agencies. And because of  this  increased interaction, new organizations have been
successfully  initiated.
One example is  COOPEC (Cooperative for Credit and  Savings). As  in  other
provinces,  communities  and organizations  in Sissilli  have little access  to either savings  or
credit. Because  of this, in 1991  the artisans  living in the department  decided  to develop
such a cooperative.  Now, COOPEC-which currently  numbers 155  people and is open to
anyone in the department-has a budget of almost 5,000,000  CFA ($10,000),  and has
extended credit in the amount of 2,325,000  CFA. Members  credit their success to two
factors: the transparence  of their management,  and the beneficial assistance of PAAB
(Programme d'appui aux artisans du Burkina). COOPEC is not a  member of any
federation,  and does  not have a relationship  with the state.  But given the recent increased
power given to  collectives by the  state and  local government, COOPEC is  now
considering  how it could  finance  productive  investments.
Institutional  development  in Sissili is rising. According  to study participants,  local
groups and organizations  are playing a stronger role in determining  the objectives  and
structure  of new projects in the department.  This increased  collaboration  takes place with
both the  local government and NGOs who, according to  study participants, now
incorporate local perceptions and values in their  projects to  create stronger local
commitment.  Study  participants  report  that the new projects  generally  emanate  from their
requests in collaboration  with the provincial  agents,  and are then implemented  with the
help of various aid groups.  Of particular  interest,  elders  councils  have been instrumental,
through their support and encouragement,  in the successful establishment  of various
consultation  councils.
Two interactive initiatives support this  expanded involvement. First, expanding
partnerships  are developed,  according  to study participants,  by using local  participation
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rural communities, local groups/associations, and the various external stakeholders. What
makes a  considerable  difference  here  is that local  institutions,  not just  geographical
communities,  are  involved. This evidently  encourages people to  be  more  active  and
responsible for future activities.
Houet  Province
Houet Province is located in the southwest of Burkina Faso, 375 km south of the capital
of Ougadougo. It is the home of the country's second largest city, Bobo Dioulasso, once
the colonial capital of the region. The population is distinct from other study provinces in
that  it is divided  fairly  evenly between 406,327 urban  inhabitants,  and  476,993 rural
inhabitants. The rate of annual growth is 4 percent. As a whole, the region is considered
the major productive  asset of the country, and Houet's  rural areas  are considered the
breadbasket of Burkina. Rainfall ranges between 1000 and  1100 mm per year, allowing
production  of  a  variety  of  agricultural  products.  In  addition  to  the  cereals  grown
throughout the province, cotton, rice, sesame, and some fruits are extensively produced,
much of it for export. Two adjoining departments-Toussiana  and Peni-were  chosen to
participate in the LLI study to guarantee the rural nature of the villages selected. Major
ethnic groups are the Toussian and the Tiefo, both of whom speak Dioula.
Local  level  institutions  in Houet  are  more  obviously divided  into two  separate
functions than in the other provinces. On the one hand, the traditional chieftancy-in  this
case  elders councils-mutual  aid  institutions,  and religious  organizations  continue  to
operate, but with a fairly low profile. Management committees exist, but they and other
kinds of councils, such as national resource management groups, have not yet found a
credible niche.
The  higher  profile organizations,  found  in  both  departments,  focus  on  economic
interests. The difference between the two departments is that  Pene does not yet have
effective relationships with the provincial government. Profiled best in Toussiana, two
institutions have emerged from associations of Groupement Villageois and those modeled
after Yatenga's  Groupement Naam. Teinsiya Association and Union Departmentale  are
typical of this new orientation.
Over  the  past  12  years,  both  the  Association  and  the  Union  have  organized
themselves,  and  each  seeks  a  collaborative  "insider"  relationship  with  provincial
authorities and the  private sector interests at that  level. Both have  set relatively  high
standards for  membership and, in that  sense, are exclusive rather  than  inclusive.  The
Association,  organized  in  1986, represents  16  organizations  and  approximately  350
families (mostly Mossi), and is organized in the image of Groupement Naam of Yatenga.
Dues are high at  10,OOOCFA,  and its objectives are to  improve food security  and the
income producing capacity of its members. In the past 10 years, it has evidently become a
powerful and competitive player in the economic life of the department and province.
The Union, organized in 1993, represents 10 associations. Its dues are lower, at 2,200
CFA, and its objectives are to improve agricultural production and the quality of life of
its  members. Despite  these  similarities,  the  Union  sees  its role  differently  than  the
Association, attempting to play the role of "a real partner in development" and selecting
activities useful for the progress of Toussiana.
Both groups, along with a  number of others, have  been invited to participate  in a
"special  delegation"  that  advises  provincial  officers  on  development  decisions  and
investments. Many  see this  as a  positive  step  forward-before  the  creation  of these
organizations,  local organizations and  institutions were not involved in provincial and
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because they have the same objectives and are vying for the same space. Like  Yatenga
Province, people in Houet Province question why there are so many organizations. One
LLI study participant pointed out that it creates mistrust and suspicion: "Certain directors
of organizations think very little of others.. they enrich themselves on the back of the
organization" (Houet Case Study, p.32). This situation has caused apprehension about the
future  of  local  institutions  among  people  active  in  local  organizations  within  the
department.
Institutional  development  in  Houet  is  developing  differently  than  in  the  other
provinces.  At  one  level, there  remains  a  relatively  strong  but  low-profile  focus  on
inclusive collective  action to  complete projects (health centers, schools, modern wells,
savings  and  credit)  that  benefit  the  whole  community  and  contribute  to  household
productivity. At the same time, associations have emerged over the past decade that are
exclusive in practice, and focus on developing greater collaboration with govemment and
the private sector for economic development.
Even the debate to establish a  balance between individual and collective  interests,
unlike  Sanmatenga  for  example,  is  taking  place  primarily  within  those  institutions
dedicated to  specific economic rather than  integrated village interests. And this debate
will  continue  for  some  time. People  active in  all  types  of  local  organizations  were
troubled by inequity. LLI study participants note in particular that the participation of all
people,  and  not  just  representatives  of  local  organizations,  must  be  involved  if
development  is to work. It was also noted that the question of participation  at group
reunions that decide on resource mobilization activities would have to be resolved if the
resource mobilization institution was to continue working well. The direction of change
in Houet, and the diversity of debate surrounding these changes, demonstrates clearly the
dynamic but different roles that LLIs play in the everyday life of local people within the
four provinces.
Key variations
Preliminary results of the 48 village participatory analyses in the four provinces were
surprising, contradicting the hypotheses originally put forward. The overall hypothesis
was that social  capital  indicators would be strong across the  four provinces. From  a
provincial  perspective,  CND and  the  national  research team  hypothesized  that  there
would be noticeable variations in local level institutions between North and South. This
made sense from both a sociological and economic perspective because there are strong
cultural,  ethnic,  economic,  and  environmental  differences  between  the  two  similar
provinces of Yatenga and Sanmatenga in the North, and the similar provinces of Houet
and Sissili in the South. It was thought important to identify and use these differences in
local level institutions if  local people were to own rural  decentralization and  make  it
sustainable.
Social capital indicators were strong. And, from a provincial perspective, the national
research teams  identified differences, but not the ones expected. Key  similarities  ran
along  unexpected  North/South  directions.  From  a  local  institution  perspective,  the
northern Province of Sanmatenga was much more similar to the  southern Province of
Sissili. Likewise, the northern Province of Yatenga unexpectedly resembled the southern
Province of Houet. North to south migration patterns, since they were fairly similar for all
four provinces, could not explain the differences.
The key variations were not based on cultural and economic differences as expected,
but  revolved  around  how  institutional  development  was  undertaken  in  each  of the
provinces  over the  past  30  years. Relatively  long and  profound participatory  efforts,
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Sanmatenga Province in the North and Sissili Province in the South. On the other hand,
LLIs showed no  similar institutional development in the southern  province of Houet.
Yatenga in the North did experience high levels of institutional development, but it was
aimed differently-at  creating effective federations for development across the province.
Strengthening  the  initial  variations  found  for  participation  and  institutional
development,  researchers  also  saw  relatively  new  organizations  linked  to  this
participatory process. These seemed to be evolving in greater numbers within the two
unexpectedly similar  provinces of Sanmatenga in the North,  and Sissili  in the  South.
Finally,  LLI  participants  in  Sanmatenga  and  Sissili  voiced  greater  optimism  about
development prospects, while LLI participants in Yatenga and Houet expressed troubling
levels of pessimism. Despite these interesting and unexpected variations, the reality of the
differences  and  similarities  could not  have been  established  through  either  a  simple
qualitative  or  quantitative  analysis.  It  takes  the  mutually  re-enforcing  use  of  both
qualitative and quantitative analysis to define these findings and their implications for
development. This is discussed in the next two chapters.
153.  QUALITATIVE  ANALYSIS  AND RESULTS:
DOING  DEVELOPMENT  THE LOCAL  WAY
The local level institutions described in the previous chapter identified organizations
with differences and similarities. In this analysis, we capture some essential elements of
structure, pattern, and meaning. The following assessment defines three critical elements:
1) active LLI categories; 2) high-performing LLIs and what makes them different; and 3)
the elements basic to their successful scaling-up. In the next chapter, these qualitative
findings are further explored through quantitative analysis.
Typology  of local  level institutions
As a result of the participatory action-research with each of the 48 villages in the four
provinces, the LLI research team identified three categories of institutions active at the
local level. The first category is a constellation of long-enduring indigenous institutions,
the second is an institution developed over colonial and early independence, the third is a
relative newcomer that incorporates development activities into daily  life in a culturally
congruent  manner.  We  have  named  these  institutional  categories  to  indicate  their
functions in local society. They are: 1) value institutions; 2) production  institutions; 3)
and service-asset management institutions. 8
The  team  found  that  stable  organizational  processes  were  basic  to  local  level
institutions  and  were  based  primarily  on  value  institutions.  Of  these,  chieftancy
institutions  were  found active in all  of the 48  villages, where  they  are credited  with
governance  of  the  village.  In  addition  to  its  public  administration  responsibilities,
chieftancy was also the primary institution for conflict resolution. This was particularly
true with land issues. According to the Burkinabe LLI report, chiefs still make decisions
about  land  tenure  that  have  full  legitimacy  in the  eyes  of  community-despite  the
national  law  (RAF),  which  supposedly  dissipates  this  power.  As  one  participant
suggested, "the ties of land and lineage have not, and will not, disappear."
Mutual aid societies, less externally recognized than chieftancy, are also an essential
facet of these value institutions. By instituting or maintaining a number of intangible but
very  real  institutional processes  such as community resource  mobilization  and social
transfers, they  enforce the societal rules that help maintain solidarity and  equity value
structures.
Production  institutions,  made up  primarily of Groupements Villageois  (GVs), are
equally  widespread  and  active  in  all  four  provinces.  They  provide  the  economic
institutional linkage between the state and the community. Formally  organized by the
state in the 1960s and 1970s, but having their roots in colonial times, GVs are now most
often organized within the villages.  These farmer organizations are the  access gate to
agricultural  extension  training  and  whatever material  agricultural  resources  the  state
offers to producers.
Organizational process  and  management depend primarily  on  organizational  goals.
Some groups, (particularly in Houet Province for example), focus almost exclusively on
providing  competitive  access to  resources for  their  members through  high  dues  and
making membership exclusive. Other GVs, also require dues but set them at a level that
almost all village members can afford. Their objectives include a more equitable access
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16to resources. Both give back to the community-however,  when the resources are not
forthcoming from the national level, both GV organizations become less active.
Service-asset management institutions (SAMs) are local level organizations, usually
of mixed gender, created recently from two historically different sources. The first is the
development committees begun more than 30 years ago to manage and maintain the then
new infrastructure assets of water wells, schools health centers, etc. The second are the
indigenous associations that have long existed among groups of contiguous villages, and
who  collaboratively  manage and  utilize economic and  natural resources (land,  forest,
water, livestock, wild-life, and some village-production activities). A few  SAMs may be
solely village based, but most (like otherLLIs) run across a group of villages that often,
but not always, have similar chieftancy and ancestral roots.
SAMs differ from the other two LLI categories (values groups and production groups)
by  combining  the  goals  of  production  and  growth  with  societal  values  of  equity,
solidarity,  and  consensus-oriented  decision-making.  SAMs  consistently  use  three
mechanisms -inclusion,  equity  expansion, and capacity compensation -to  manage
assets  for development  and  growth in environments that are  often severely  resource-
constrained.
These three categories make up a useful institutional typology.
*  VALUE  INSTITUTIONS  focus  on  activating and  maintaining  the  stability  of  local
governance,  cultural,  and  values  of  the  society.  This  group  includes chieftancy
groups, and  all  religious  oriented  or  mutual  aid  institutions  active  in  rural  life.
Societal values -emphasizing  solidarity, equity, and consensus -directly  shape
the functioning of these institutions.
*  PRODUCTION INSTITUTIONS  comprise the  majority of  economic development
organizations  created  over  the  past  40  years.  Their  main  objective  is  to  access
resources from the national government in order to increase agricultural production.
They focus on economic growth using Western organizational patterns.
*  SERVICE-ASSET  MANAGEMENT  INSTITUTIONS  integrate productivity  and growth
values with the societal principles of solidarity, equity, and consensus. Their main
objective  is to  manage and  expand  local  assets  for  development  in  a  culturally
sustainable manner
High  performing  institutions  are identifiable
The service-asset management (SAM) institutional category, a relative newcomer to
rural  life, was particularly  effective in promoting  equitable but  growth oriented  local
development. Our qualitative analysis indicates that SAMs scale-up internal organization
within villages and provinces by implementing a culturally coherent kind of development
that balances equity and enhanced productivity.  SAMs can be qualitatively identified by
the way they achieve this scaling-up--the  consistent use of three mechanisms: inclusion,
equity expansion, and capacity compensation.
Inclusion is the first management mechanism for  categorization as a  service-asset
management organization. For example, Sanmatenga and Sissili Provinces -where  the
greatest numbers of SAMs are found -also  have the highest number of management
committee  organizations,  with  high  numbers  of  consultative  councils,  deliberative
committees,  and  federative  arrangements.  Almost  every  village  has  an  array  of
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participation -that  is, sharing information, then defining consensual steps for action on
priority  problems,  many  of  which  are  collective  problems.  In  particular,  these
organizations feature collaboration among chiefs, development organization leaders, and
community members. This consensual path (also found to a lesser extent in Yatenga, but
rarely in Houet) is essential in clearing barriers that often exist between traditional chiefs
and development leaders. This inclusive orientation also allows larger and more diverse
organizational groups to mobilize for action rather than just the one or two effected by a
decision.  In sum, this  makes  the  societal value  of solidarity  functional  in  the  local
economic/development process.
Water committees are good examples of inclusive management. They make decisions
that ensure a maximum number of working boreholes or ponds with water within walking
distance of the community during the dry season, with adequate back-ups if there  are
break-downs. If their  decisions are  not inclusively managed,  it can effect  production
capacity, as well  as the  health of community members and their  livestock. Similarly,
water committees  and  other traditional resource management councils  have  extensive
responsibilities in resolving conflicts between sedentary farming villages andpastoralists
for access to and management of water.  Sanmatenga, for example, has large populations
of  pastoralists  using  water  sites  alongside village  farmers  with  little  or  no  conflict.
Inclusive management supports conflict resolution, while scaling up productivity.
Where the inclusive management focused is also important. The two culturally and
environmentally different provinces of Sanmatenga in the north and Sissili in the south,
for example, both decided to focus at the village level, and a number of organizational
mechanisms  for  consultation  and  consensus-building  around  development  were
subsequently  built.  On  the  other  hand, Yatenga  Province  (particularly  Groupement
Naam) focused its inclusion on federated institutions and members across villages, rather
than on the village as a whole. While Naam's objectives were laudable-  the democratic
participation of all members without distinction to rank, and the incorporating of new
learning from external partners-  part of its impact at the village level was unexpected
and  negative.  It  strengthened the Naam  Federation  but  evidently  diminished  village
capacity for trust and collaborative action.
Equity expansion is the second management mechanism that identifies SAMs. At the
village  level, one way  in which  service-asset management groups create  the  alliance
between  enhanced  productivity  and  local  values  is  how  they  define  and  undertake
organizational  responsibilities.  For  instance,  SAMs  take  on  responsibility  for  the
following  agenda:  1)  establishing  a  management  role  that  strategically  uses  scarce
resources  to  expand  as  well  as  maintain  the  resource;  2)  undertaking  an
advocacy/sensitization role for the correct use of resources; 3) implementing a planning
role  within  the  village  that  emphasizes  productivity  and  poverty  reduction;  and  4)
supporting participatory and federative institutional arrangement where collaboration  is
formalized with partners inside and outside the village. The interplay between  the first
two  agenda items,  which are concerned  with production,  and  the second  two,  which
foster  inclusion and equity, create the crucial equity expansion.
Reviewing how  SAM education committees  interpret strategic management  shows
how equity expansion works. All education committees take care of the time-consuming
and expensive tasks of repair and maintenance (for example, the Parent's Association of
Ziga spent 340,000 CFA [$6801 on school maintenance in  1996). They also do  fund-
raising and sometimes offer advisory services to the principal and teaching staff. Under
their strategic management for equity expansion, SAM education committees do much
more.  They establish  and  enforce tuition  payments, deciding  how  long  students can
attend  without paying  and  when rules must  be enforced. If a  family  is truly  without
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these resources are used elsewhere, students are finally asked to  leave. In Sanmatenga,
for example,  17 students were asked to leave at mid-year in 1996, but Houet Province
Committees were much less successful in agreeing to and enforcing the same kind of
decisions. At the same time, SAM education committees take responsibility for guiding
school expansion, and helping parents to understand why sending girls to  school is as
important as sending boys to school.
Evidently,  SAM-type  organizations  interpret  local  values  so  that  their  essence
remains, but at the same time there  is a tension between how the value was originally
interpreted and the need to be economically productive. This explicit balancing  act not
only facilitates the emergence of the new SAMs institutional category, it also strengthens
the existing values institutions.
For example, mutual aid societies (classified as part of the values institution category)
have  taken the  cultural value  of solidarity and established a  number  of expectations,
rules,  processes,  and  structural procedures that  translate  into the  well  established,  if
intangible, social transfers institution. This institutional structure guarantees  an equity
across communities secured by lineage. At the same time, these same values of solidarity
and  equity pose  heavy  burdens  for those  trying to  maximize  individual  savings  for
investment.  Therefore,  SAM  oriented  management  rules  governing  rural  savings
federations (such as COOPEC in Sissili or URCP in Yatenga) reflect the dual need for
members to both save and honor societal responsibilities. (The rules of these rural credit
associations do not allow quick withdrawal of savings, but guarantee quick credit  for
smaller amounts. This  allows rural  credit  members to  meet societal  expectations, but
keeps  controls  on  savings.)  Recognizing  these  dual  needs  strengthens  the  values
institutions while expanding service-asset-management institutions.
Capacity compensation is the third  mechanism that identifies  SAMs. The routine
use by SAM organizations of inclusion and equity management mechanisms also has an
unexpected-at  least to outsiders-  capacity compensation side-effect, which seems to
be critical to building high performance. Two factors in particular-  information-sharing
and collective problem analysis - contribute to this institutional development process.
The idea of information-sharing and collective problem analysis was introduced  to
local level institutions in three of the four provinces during the  1970s. As mentioned
earlier, FEER (Fonds de 1  'eau et de 1  'Equipment Rural), a government agency committed
to a long-term participatory processes, was in the early 1970s instrumental in starting this
new kind  of participatory and  collective interests  approach. It  focused on  local level
institutions  and villages  in Sanmatenga, where  it initiated "peasant debates"  to  begin
village and inter-village discussion of long-term development priorities. The subsequent
decision  of the  chieftancy  and  development  organizations in  Sanmatenga designated
within  each village  (including the  12 LLI  villages)  an  organization  responsible  for
";action-research planning,"  then  formalized  and  internalized  this  information  and
analysis process.  An NGO  later undertook the  same kind of participatory  process  in
Sissili,  and the  Elder Councils encouraged multiple federative  arrangements to  ensure
collaboration with  partners inside and outside the village. Yatenga Province also went
through the same processes but, as mentioned earlier, aimed it at the federation and not
the village, so it did not have the same effect.
There is another closely connected dimension to this "capacity compensation" that
concerns sequencing. LLI researchers, based on rural participant  discussions, identified
both "local accountability" and "culture-based" as the two components most likely to be
missing  from  external  donor  projects.  LLI findings  indicate  that  without  these  two
institutional dimensions, new organizations quickly disappear - regardless of whether
they  are  externally  funded  or  internally initiated.  It  seems  then  that  while  technical
19capacity is critical for long-term success, its lack can be buffered for some indeterminate
period of time by other  institutional dimensions. Evidently, using  inclusion and equity
expansion mechanisms permits local level institutions that lack the technical capacity for
effective functioning to borrow or tap into other local organizations that do. This suggests
that  the  buffering  aspect  automatically  built  into  SAM  organizations  gives  these
organizations an advantage.
Locally  anchored  participation  is key to success
When deciding  on  priorities  and  actions,  service-asset management  organizations
consider both relational and individual interests. SAMs clearly  define the tension  that
exists -and  the balance selected -between  the strongly held  community values of
equity, solidarity, and consensus, and the need to save, invest, produce and grow at the
household  and  community  level.  The  balance  selected  is  neither  ideological  nor
inflexible; instead, the balance factor is situational-for  one activity favoring community
collective need or action, and in another favoring individual household interests. But how
do SAMs, as high performing local institutions, select this situational balance not once or
twice, but repeatedly?
The  answer  is  in  SAMs'  own  internally  anchored  and  formalized  participation
process. This formal institutionalization allows SAMs to  accomplish a  scaled-up two-
cycle  participation  to  select  the  situational  balance.  The  first  cycle,  participatory
diagnosis of problems and decision for action, is a familiar one. Government and donor
programs and projects  throughout Africa use it, and  recognize it as critical  for  initial
success.
But there  is a  second cycle,  rarely recognized, which  is essential  for  sustainable
success. The second cycle renegotiates power alignments and makes internal institutional
revisions  so  that  problem  diagnosis  can  be  addressed. In  this  case,  the  SAM,  by
repeatedly selecting a situational balance between societal values and the need to produce
and grow, finds itself  in an iterative negotiation of power alignments and  institutional
revision. It is these institutional revisions that are critical to the functional  scaling-up of
these institutions.
How do we know that this is what SAMs do? Local people of any nation rarely, if
ever,  sit  down  to  discuss  "institutional  arrangements"  or  "two-cycle  participation."
However,  within  the  LLI work,  village  participants  did  identify  the  organizational
dimensions they  believed essential for  undertaking social and  economic development.
These four dimensions outline and track the internalized participation cycle. As outlined
in the results of the LLI community analysis,9  they are:
*  Local institutional accountability
L  Local technical & intellectual capacity for  management
a  Economic strategies based on existing local resources
*  Cultural and emotional resonance.
These dimensions have particular meaning for local institutions  and  communities.
Local institutional accountability means that local groups want development initiatives to
be  accountable  to  their  own  local  institutions -committees,  councils,  and  chiefs.
Accountability only to local government or donors is not enough. Local technical and
9 Karim  Ouedraogo,  Rapport  Synthese.
20intellectual  capacity for  management  means  that  if  people  and  organizations  in  a
particular geographic area cannot manage and sustain an input, they  do not consider it
worthy of their time. Economic strategies based on local resources means that if strategic
use of a development resource is not within existing resources, local people cannot view
it as a  priority.  Finally, cultural  and emotional resonance refers  to  how  people  feel
connected to development initiatives. If the initiative reflects local values and ways of
organization, it has both collective cultural and individual emotional resonance.
Using  these  four  organizational  dimensions as a  guide, it  becomes evident  why
service-asset management  organizations have evolved over the past  20  years into the
newest recognizable  institution to meet the  internal  needs of  economic development.
Neither  the  existing  values nor  production  institutions offer  all  four  of the  requisite
organizational dimensions. Table I shows that, to operate well, values institutions do not
necessarily require a  "local technical capacity for  management." It  also  indicates that
production institutions do not require "cultural and emotional resonance" to achieve their
objectives. But as we can see, SAMs can and do deliver on all four dimensions.
Table  I Types  of LLls  and  use of the  four institutional  dimensions
Type  of LLls  Local  Technical  capacity  for  Economic  strategies  Cultural/emotional
accountability  management  on local  resources  resonance
Value  X  X
SAM  4  4
Production  4
SAMs are able to deliver because of their internally anchored participation. Table 2
illustrates the  differences  in delivery  capacity among  different kinds  of participation.
Consultation only delivers on two out of the four dimensions. Beneficiary empowerment,
comes from external government or donor sources. But neither measure up to SAMs'
internally anchored process.
Table  2 Participation  Type and  use of  four institutional  dimensions
Local  development  Cultural  and
Type  of Participation  Local  Local  technical  strategy  emotional
accountability  capacity  resonance
No Participation  None  None  None  None
Consultation  None  Partial  Partial  None
External  Beneficiary  Partial  Partial  Partial  None
Empowerment  I_  ____  _
Internally  Anchored  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
In reviewing Table 2 we automatically ask ourselves just how important are cultural
and emotional resonance? Two points are important here.  SAMs' use of a participation
process that internalizes cultural values in organizational strategies provides the essential
trust that is a hallmark of well-performing LLIs. For example, the "Voices  of the Poor"
recently  underlined  how  local  people  trust  their  own  institutions,  but  are  markedly
skeptical of others.  Equally  important, but at  this  moment less recognized,  this  trust
generates  the  social  energy  and  hope  critical  for  participation's  second cycle  work.
Renegotiating existing power alignments and making  institutional revisions  are not just
21technical initiatives-  they demand high trust and high energy. Both collective cultural
attachments and individualized emotional attachments must be in sync if participation's
second cycle  is to  operate sustainably. We can therefore  conclude that  'cultural  and
emotional resonance'  are critical.
Key qualitative  results
This  qualitative  analysis  demonstrates  how  high  performing  service-asset-
management institutions-  a  category of local level institutions-  solidly  contribute  to
poverty reduction  and economic  growth at  the local level. These LLI/SAMs use  and
practice  three  societally fashioned  management mechanisms:  1) inclusion;  2) equity
expansion; and 3) capacity compensation in their management of collective assets. Found
primarily  among  provinces  that  feature  a  great  variation  in  cultural  institutions,
environment resource base, and  production structures, their  greatest similarity  is well
functioning internalized participation structures.
The LLI study framework, outlined in Chapter 1, suggests why these values fashioned
mechanisms have  such an impact. The notion of changing cognitive societal values to
functional  ones, as suggested by Uphoff, is clear. For example, participants in the LLI
study from all four provinces insist on their attachment to the ideals of solidarity, equity,
and consensus, although, culturally, they express these values differently. However, only
two of the provinces have been able to act on these cognitively held ideals and  make
them  function  in development activities. The mechanism by  which they  were able to
achieve  this  change  from  cognitive  to  functional  values  is  through  internalized
participation. In particular, recognition of two-cycle participation, which allows not only
diagnosis  of  problems  but  also  the  internal  revision  of  institutions,  is  the  critical
mechanism by which  values pass from the theoretical or cognitive realm  to everyday
functionality.
SAMs not only solidly contribute to poverty reduction and growth at the local level,
they  do  so  in  a  critically  different  way  than  do  current  poverty  reduction  models.
SAM/LLIs reorder things to match both their values and resource constraints. SAM/LLIs
see equity and solidarity as the initiator or leverage point, with development and growth
the result - an extraordinarily innovative capacity. But to understand the implications of
this  capacity  we must  first accept the possibility that economic  development requires
congruent cultural values for long-term and sustainable success.
224.  QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS  & RESULTS:
IMPACT  OF HIGH PERFORMING  LOCAL  LEVEL
INSTITUTIONS  ON EQUITY  AND POVERTY
The  qualitative  analysis  in  the  previous  chapter  has  provided  a  great  deal  of
information on how  village level local institutions, especially the  SAM type  of  LLIs,
operate within the local social structure. Of special interest is how SAMs make decisions
and take actions based on  culturally preferred values. The qualitative  studies conclude
that  LLI/SAMs play  a  crucial role in  shaping inclusive and equitable  local economic
development strategies consistent with the local cultural values.
Normally,  these  qualitative  studies  are  useful  for  defining  solutions  in  only  one
geographical area because it is debatable whether that solution can be applied elsewhere.
In these situations, a complementary quantitative study can enhance the usefulness of a
qualitative study  outside the  study area. This  chapter provides  such a  study, offering
statistical validation to the qualitative results.
The most important finding of the quantitative analysis is that everything identified by
the  qualitative  study  about  SAM/LLIs  is  linked  to  lower  levels  of  inequality.
Development agencies now understand that reducing poverty in Africa requires reduced
inequality  and  accelerated growth. Past  experience has  shown that, without  a  certain
degree of equity in income distribution, growth cannot be sustained (SPA  1999). The
statistical  link  between  LLIs/SAM  and  equity  allows  us  to  affirm  the  innovative
economic achievements of LLIs/SAM, measure them with mathematical precision, and
predict their impact on future poverty reduction.
Measuring  local level  accomplishments  through  a different  lens
Based on the qualitative studies, Sissili Province in the south and Sanmatanga Province
in the north have a more effective mix of balanced LLIs, (i.e., a relatively large proportion
of SAMs). In addition, locally anchored participation and consensus building, as practiced
by  SAMs, are stressed  more at the  village  level than  in  the other  two provinces.  This
combination of an effective LLIISAM mix, according to the qualitative analysis, creates an
equitable development that balances relational as well as individual well-being,  a value
largely preferred by Burkinabe.
An  assessment  of  inequality,  poverty,  and  household expenditure  per  capita  by
province  provided  a  breakthrough  for  our  LLI/SAM  study.  Results  of  our  initial
quantitative comparisons (trying to find a link between effective LLI/SAM and economic
development among the four provinces) revealed no consistent relationships or patterns.
The mean expenditure per  capita measures are similar in the two northern and the two
southern provinces-just  as what would have been expected in the absence of LLI/SAM
impact  (see  Table  3).  But  as  we  changed  our  focus  to  poverty  and  inequality
measurements, the accomplishments of LLIs/SAMs became apparent.
Table 3 shows intriguing poverty variations among the four surveyed provinces. 10 In
the southern part of Burkina Faso, the poverty incidence in Sissili is almost 40 percent
'° Household expenditure data (959 surveyed Households in 48 participating communities) were  used to
calculate poverty and inequality measurements by province.
23lower than that of Houet.1i The difference in poverty incidence between Sissili and Houet
is  because  Sissili  has  a  much  more  equitable  income distribution.  The  income gap
measurement also shows that the poor in Sissili are, on average, less poor than the poor in
Houet. Because  of its more equitable income distribution, Sissili has achieved a lower
level  of  poverty  with  the  same  level  of  economic  development  as Houet.  (Mean
expenditure  per  capita  between  Houet  and  Sissily are  not  statistically  significantly
different.) In the northern areas, both the provinces of  Sanmatenga and Yatenga have
similar  levels  of  economic  development  (mean  expenditure  per  capita  are  similar).
However, because of the much lower inequality in Sanmatenga, its poverty incidence is
20 percent lower than in Yatenga. Also, using the income gap measure, we find that the
poor in Sanmatenga are less impoverished than the poor in Yatenga.
Table  3 Poverty,  inequality  and mean  expenditure  by  province
Poverty  measures
Area of country  Province  Poverty  Inequality  Mean
incidence  Poverty  gap  Income  gap  E(1)  expenditure
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  per  capita
South  Sissili  19  5  24  11  65851
South  Houet  30  11  35  20  67551
North  Sanmatenga  37  8  22  10  53817
North  lYatenga  46  20  44  27  54751
*Note:  The  differences  in  poverty  incidence  and  inequality between  Sissili  and  Houet,  and  between
Sanmatenga and Yatenga are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.  The differences between the
mean expenditure per  capita are not  statistically significant between the Sissili and Houet,  nor between
Sanmatenga and Yatenga.
From a different perspective, Figure 2 illustrates how lower inequality today can mean
reduced poverty tomorrow. For example, even though the two provinces  in the south
have the same expenditure level, I percent of growth in Sissili would generate 2.6 percent
poverty reduction (growth elasticity=2.6), while  1 percent growth in Houet would only
generate  1.6 percent poverty reduction. Similarly,  I percent growth in Yatenga would
generate only 1.1 percent poverty reduction, while one percent of growth would generate
2.4  percent  poverty  reduction  in  Sanmatanga. 12 Also,  the  lower  inequality  not only
accelerates the speed of poverty reduction by 60-100 percent in these  cases, it can in
general, also sustain growth better in the long run.
i  The poverty line is defined as two-thirds of national mean expenditure per capita. Poverty incidence was
calculated as the ratio of population living in households with expenditure per capita less than the poverty
line to the total population, which gives a scope of poverty. Income gap is calculated as the percentage short-
fall of the poor population's  mean expenditure per capita  from the poverty line, which gives a depth  of
poverty among the poor. Inequality is measured by one of the entropy class measurements, E(1), the Theil
index, which is equally sensitive to changes across a distribution.
12  Growth elasticity was calculated by using POVCAL, written by Shaohua chen and published by the World
Bank.
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In  short,  the  comparison  between  "levels  of  inequality/poverty"  and  the  qualitative
assessment  of  LLIs  shows  the  actual  accomplishment  of LLIs/SAM.  These  results,  with
strong  statistical  significance,  are  consistent  with  the  qualitative  findings  that  more
effective  LLIs/SAM  in  Sissili  and  Sanmatanga  provinces,  despite  their  regional
variations,  create  a  collective  and  sustainable  prosperity.  With  the  change  of  the
measurement  lens,  the  actual  achievements  of  local  communities  and  their  institutions
come into focus.  Given  this,  our  following  quantitative  analysis  shifts  the  usual  focus  of
economic  analysis  from  measuring  an  individual  return  (typically  expenditure  per capita)
to reviewing  a balanced  return  between  individual  and society.
Measuring high-performance impact
The qualitative  analysis  in this  study  expressed  the  complexity  of the  LLI interactions
with  the  other  aspects  of  Burkinabe  society.  Specifically,  it analyzes  the  factors  which
affect  the  quality  of  LLI  performance  and  points  to  possible  socio-economic  impacts
resulting  from  these  high  performances.  As  suggested  by  the  qualitative  analysis,  a
variety  of "institutional  rules  of  the  game,"  as  promulgated  by different  kinds  of  LLIs,
actually  shape  implementation  of  community-based  approaches  to  development.  In
particular,  an  effective  mix  of  different  LLI  structures-featuring  service-asset
management  groups  (SAMs)  with all of their  dimensions-creates  an  inclusive  economic
development  that  also  favors  higher  growth.  But  are  the  economic  benefits  of  these
shaping  factors,  as  stated  by  the  qualitative  study,  strong  enough  to  be  seen  in  the
quantitative  measurements?
The four-province  quantitative  analysis  finds  a positive  association  between  effective
LLI/SAM  mix  and  a  more  inclusive  development  which  leads  to  more  rapid  poverty
reduction,  as illustrated  in Table  3 and  Figure  2.  However,  this  quantitative  validation  is
regional.  In order  to provide  credibility  for LLI/SAM  scaling  up across  villages  as  found
in the  qualitative  study,  positive  correlation  between  LLI/SAM  high  performance  and
increased  economic  benefits  must  be  validated  across  the  four  provinces.  This  section
therefore  asks  whether  there  is a correlation  between  the  quantitative  measurements  and
25high  performing  LLIs/SAM,  as  shaped  by  the  less  tangible  four  organizational
dimensions discussed in the previous chapter.
Our  first  clue  concerning  LL/SAM  performance  is  based  on  provincial  official
assessment  of internal organizations. "Level of organization" in Table 4  indicates the
provincial  official  assessment  of  how  well  each  village  is  organized.  Although  not
explicitly confirmed in each instance, we can confidently say that this provincial official
assessment of village level organization was formulated according to how effectively the
four organizational dimensions (Chapter 3) were utilized at the community level. Table 4
presents the cross tabulation between the level of village organization and quantitatively
measured economic indicators. The most intriguing comparison is that the higher level of
village organization consistently correlates with a lower level of inequality, statistically
significant at  95  percent  level. The  differences between  the  low  and  the  high  level
villages are also striking. Not only is expenditure per capita much higher among highly
organized villages, but the inequality is also much lower'  3 This is again consistent with
the  qualitative  assessment  that  higher performing LLIs/SAM  lead to  more  equitable
distribution, and a higher growth rate.'4 Given the fact that these officials  assessed the
villages  without  knowing  anything  from  the  quantitative  data,  the  high  degree  of
consistency is remarkable.
Table  4 Poverty  and  village  institutional  organization
Poverty  I
Poverty  Inequality  E(1) Mean
Level  of village  incidence  Poverty  Income  Gap (%)  expenditure  Number  of
Organization  (%)  gap  (%)  per  capita  observation
Low  41  14  34  21  56795  370
Medium  32  12  37  19  60544  308
High  23  6  128  12  65602  281
Note: The difference in poverty incidence between low and medium, and also poverty incidence between medium and
high, are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. In addition, the difference in inequality between low and high,
and between medium and high, are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
In  order to  evaluate  how  a balanced mix of different LLIs  affects household and
community  economic welfare  indicators, we  studied the  membership  patterns  among
different  type  of LLIs. Based  on the household survey data, the  majority  households
(over  80  percent)  are  active  in  at  least  one  type  of  LLI.  Among  all  participating
households, about  two thirds join  one type  of LLI only, typically joining  production
groups. The other one third of households mostly join two kinds of LLIs, with the mix of
memberships  being  typically  in  value  and  production  groups,  or  in  service-assets-
management  (SAM) and production groups. Very few households participated  in only
value and SAM groups. Among all households, memberships in production groups are by
far the most prevalent.
This  division  of LLI  memberships  allows  us  to  discern  some  economic  patterns
among  households  associated  with  different  kinds  of  LLIs.  First,  we  divided  all
13 Growth elasticity is -1.5,  -1.7 and -2.3 for low, medium, and high level villages, respectively.
14 We choose "consistent with"  rather than "validating" the qualitative results for this result on purpose.
While with only one point of data we cannot rigorously prove that the higher income and lower inequality are
the results of high performing LLIs, the complementary analyses used by both qualitative and quantitative
methods certainly provides more credibility than using only one of the methods.
26households into LLIs participating and non-participating households. Second, among all
participating  households,  we  divided  households  into  SAM/production  group,
value/production group, and production group only. The purpose of this  division is to
compare the economic outcomes of the households that have a mixed memberships with
the  households  who join  production  groups  only. In addition, Kombi Naam  groups,
although  a type  of service-asset management, are treated  separately  because  of their
network  focus,  compared  to  most  SAMs,  which  feature  a  village  level  focus.  The
comparative group for Kombi Naam groups are the households in Yatenga that belong
only  to  production  groups.  (This  is  because  the  Naam  memberships  are  primarily
reported in Yatenga. To eliminate the regional effect, we thus restricted the comparing
households to Yatenga).
As shown in Table 5, when  looking at participating vs. nonparticipating households
(without  distinguishing  among  different  kinds  of LLIs),  the  lower  poverty  among
participating households results from higher mean expenditure per capita. This means the
inequality between the participating and non-participating households are identical. This
finding is consistent with the qualitative analysis that high performingLLIs/SAM are the
result of complex interactions among different factors, and the mere existence ofLLIs in
a village does not guarantee more equitable growth.
One of the most important things found in the qualitative study is the balanced mix of
different LLIs, and how, within this mix, SAMs play a critical role. When we look at the
households participating  in both SAM and production groups, we see that, by  far, the
inequality  is the  lowest among  all  groups. Value/production  groups  have  the  lowest
poverty  incidence; however, this  is  because of much  higher consumption  levels,  not
lower  inequality. Based on the qualitative study, we know that a  large portion  of the
values  group  membership  consists  of  local  elite  who  routinely  enjoy  good  social
connections and privileged access to resources. In addition, even though there is a higher
percentage of poor households among SAM participating households, they  are less poor
than  the poor households  of all other groups, including those in the value/production
groups.
These results  are consistent with the qualitative findings that  SAM groups  are the
most  effective  of  the  development  institutions,  and  that  they  create  capacity
compensation for other kinds of LLIs. Thus, a mix of SAM organizations, combined with
other  kinds  of institutions,  contributes  measurably to an  equitable development  path.
Although higher growth, as described by the qualitative study, is not proven through this
specific division of population, one must remember thatSAMs are a new group that have
only come into existence over the past 25 years. They are also relatively small in number,
and work in extremely resource constrained environments. All of this makes it difficult to
discern measurable growth impact. At this point, the most important message of the low
inequality  and poverty  depth found  among SAM\production participants  is that these
households have  started on a more equitable growth path. This equitable growth path
will, in time, bear fruit  in achieving both higher growth rates  and more rapid poverty
reduction.
27Table 5 Poverty indicators by household participation
in different institutional types
Mean  Poverty  Theil index of
expenditure  Incidence  inequality  Income  Number  of
per capita  Po  (%)  E(1)  Gap  households
Participating  hhds  61606  30  17  34  782
Non-participating  hhds  55029  39  17  33  177
Service-Asset  Mgt/Production  59836  27  10*  24  99
Value/Production  groups  68270  20  16  30  103
Production  group  only  61996  30  16  35  378
Kombi-Naam  in Yatenga  55633  41  24  41  141
Production  group  in Yatenga  45524  58  29  50  53
Note: SAM/production groups includes households who participated in both SAM and production groups, a
few of them were also in value groups. Value/production groups includes households who participated in
value and production groups. Kombi Naam groups include households who participated Kombi Naarn and
any other groups. Production group includes households who participated in production groups only.
*  The difference in E(l)  is statistically significant at 95 percent between SAM/Production and any other
group.
In addition to rating village  level organization, provincial officials  were also asked
about the village economy. When these provincial assessments of village economy are
compared with the quantitative indicators, the differences again are manifested  in both
equity and  expenditure  per capita (see  Table  6). Apparently, the minimal  differences
found  among  villages  featuring  medium or  high  levels  of  economy  illustrates  the
difficulty  in  making  relevant  distinctions  among  these  two  groups.  However,  if  we
compare the high/medium level villages with the low level villages, once again, we find
that not only do the villages rated medium/high have higher levels of mean expenditure
per capita, but they also have lower levels of inequality. This is one more validation that
relational economic development  is strongly valued, and  is a  driving force in shaping
Burkinabe efforts and decisions for achieving prosperity and growth.' 5
Table 6. Poverty indicators and village level economy
Poverty  I
Poverty  Poverty  Income  Inequality  Mean  Number  of
Level  of village  incidence gap  Gap  E(1)  expenditure observation
Economy  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  per  capita
Low  41  15  37  20  54454  428
Medium  26  7  27  16  66469  291
High  26  8  31  15  64578  240
Note: The difference in poverty incidence and inequality between low and medium, as well as between low
and high is statistically significant at 95 percent level.
The qualitative finding that a balanced mix of different types of LLIs/SAMs brings a
more inclusive development is shown in the quantitative measurement of inequality. The
'5  We also computed mean expenditure per capita, inequality and poverty measures for villages according to
their levels of organizations, economy and services within each province. The results, available upon request,
are mostly consistent with the across provincial tabulations.
28results  validate  the  qualitative  identification  of  effective  LLIs  and  their
accomplishments.  However, the validation  only  becomes clear when  the  quantitative
measurement lens is changed to reflect equity and poverty reduction. The materialization
of  intangibles,  mainly  the  four  institutional  dimensions  and  locally  anchored
participation, is evident in both individual (mean expenditure per capita) and relational
(inequality) economic  indicators. Again and again, our  findings show that Burkinabe
value relational welfare as much as they value individual welfare.
Regression  analysis:  another  validation  of qualitative  findings
In  this  section  we  use  multivariate  regression  analysis  to  further  validate  the
qualitative  results.  First  regression  is  a  Probit  model,  using  poverty  status  as  the
dependent  variable  (poor- 1,  nonpoor=O). This  model  focuses  on  how  different
independent  variables  are  associated with  the  possibility  of being  poor.  The  second
regression is a Tobit model, using logarithm of income gap per capita as the dependent
variable.' 6 This  model investigates how  different independent variables  are associated
with  the  depth of  the  poverty. Finally,  the  third  is  an OLS  model,  using  logarithm
expenditure per capita as dependent variable. This model examines associations between
the dependent variables  and the household well-being, as measured by expenditure  per
capita. Table 9 illustrates the regression estimates.
The regression figures validate some important previous findings with high statistical
significance. The results  indicate that the villages assessed as higher in organizational
level are associated with a lower likelihood of being poor (regression 1). For the poor, the
higher level of village organization is also linked with being less impoverished (smaller
income gap, regression 2).  Also, results  indicate that both the household level  social
capital generated by LLIs (i.e., memberships and/or leaderships in village  institutions)
and  the village  level  social capital  (i.e., level  of village organization  and  number  of
village institutions) are linked to a lower chance of being poor and smaller income gaps.
This,  combined  with  the  sociological  assessment,  indicates  that  village  level  local
institutions benefit not only households who have memberships, but also benefit those in
the village without membershipsl 7.
The  parameter  estimates  for  different  combinations  of  memberships,  such  as
value/production  or  SAM/production  groups,  are  not  statistically  significant  in  the
regression. Some of the more complex features of LLIs-including  the four institutional
dimensions and locally anchored participation-cannot  be explicitly measured, but they
have been identified as main contributors to the effectiveness of high performing LLIs.'
This is consistent with our tabulation results, which indicate that, for the time being, the
quantitative results can only illustrate the equity aspects of SAM impacts. However, we
predict with confidence that this high degree of equity will lead to a higher growth and
more  rapid  poverty  reduction  in  the  near  future.  This  suggests  that,  in  future  LLI
16 Income gap is defined as the absolute value of expenditure per capita below the poverty line. Here, the
income  gap actually  means  the shortfall  of expenditure.  However,  it is customary  to call it income  gap.
17 For causality argument please see footnote 6.
's  We did attempt to use interactive  variables  between  kinds of LLIs and level of village organization  to
evaluate their impact on poverty. The combination  of high level village organization  and the service-
management  group did show positive impact on poverty  reduction,  however,  not statistically  significant.
However,  we decided  not to pursue  it further because  the number  of observations  in each defined  category
was getting  too small.
29initiatives, more effort  should be put into measuring the traditionally  non-measurable
indicators.
Another  social capital indicator in the regressions is the existence of state or NGO
initiated institutions  in the village.  The regression estimates show that having state or
NGO initiated institutions in the village increased the chances of being poor and of a
greater income gap. This probably means that the state and NGOs tend to provide aid in
villages with more poor people.'9 Interestingly enough, the levels of village economy and
services, assessed by  the provincial  officials, do  not show any  statistically  consistent
association with poverty or consumption at the individual household level.
"' Most  of other  regression  estimates  have  the signs  that we  had expected.  However,  the explanations  of these
estimates  are not relevant  to this study.  They  are available  upon  request.
30Table 7 Regression estimates
Regression  1:  Regression  2:  |Regression  3:
Independent  variable  Probit  model  "]  Tobit  model  b|  OLS model  bl
(dep  var=poverty  status)  (dep  var=log  exp  gap)  (dep  var=log  exp  per capita)
Provincial  inequality  index,  E(1)  0.013*  0.36*  -0.01*
Measurement  of household  level  social  cal)
Number  of active  members  in LLIs  -0.041*  -1.19*  0.05*
Holding  elected  position  in LLls  -0.116*  -3.85*  0.12*
Household  participating  in
Service/management  group  etc.  0.114  3.01  -0.06
Production  group  only  -0.002  -0.15  0.002
Value  group  etc.  -0.003  -0.13  -0.01
Group  de Naam  etc.  -0.034  -0.85  0.04
Measurement  of  Village  level  social  capita
Level  of  village  organization
Medium  -0.071*  -2.00  0.09*
High  -0.105*  -3.10*  0.10*
Level  of  village  economy
Medium  -0.018  1.57  0.01*
High  0.053  1.64  -0.12
Level  of village  services
Medium  0.050  -0.61  -0.17
High  0.065  1.49  -0.07*
(Low  level  is the  default)
Number  of institutions  in the village  -0.014*  -0.44*  0.02*
State  or NGO  initiated  institutions  0.136*  4.49*  -0.20*
Household  characteristics
Household  size  0.029*  0.84*  -0.05*
Sex  of household  head  (1=male)  -0.133*  -3.91*  0.25*
Years  of education  -0.  124*  -4.18*  0.13*
Number  of big animals  owned  -0.005*  -0.15*  0.01*
Number  of medium  animals  owned  -0.004*  -0.109*  0.002
Number  of small  animals  owned  -0.002*  -0.07*  0.003*
Hectares  of land  owned  -0.005  -0.14  0.02*
Own  plough  -0.022  -0.56  -0.02
Own  motored  transportation  -0.062**  -1.84**  0.  14*
Own  bicycles  -0.055  -1.67  0.07
Own  ratio/tv  -0.055-  -1.42  0.08*
Own  other  unspecified  assets  -0.031  -1.17  0.07**
Community characteristics
Existence  of all season  road  -0.086*  -2.82*  0.07
Distance  to market  0.013*  0.31*  -0.03*
Distance  to health  center  0.002  0.04  -0.001
LL= -438  LL= -1170  R-squire=0.35
Note; '*'  indicates statistically significant  at 95 percent  level, i5*  indicates  statistically  significant  at 90% level.
'9  Numbers  in the  column  show  marginal  effect  of respective  independent  variables.
b) Numbers  in the column  are  coefficient  estimates  of respective  independent  variables.
31Key quantitative  results
This quantitative  study has validated with statistical significance the main  results of
the  qualitative  analysis  of  the  preceding  chapter.  The  first  step  to  quantitatively
understand and capture LLIs/SAM achievement (identified by the qualitative study) is to
shift the focus from a utilitarian economic to a relational economic point of view-that  is,
to measure both the individual and the social return. Individual return is reflected mostly
in the differences in expenditure per capita, while the social return is seen mainly in the
differences in inequality. The magnitude of inequality is simply a manifestation of the
underlying  social  structures,  values,  power  arrangements  and  resources/assets
distribution.  Only  when  we  understand  inequality  within  its  social  context,  do  the
findings become applicable to real world operations.
Differences  in poverty  and  the  poverty  gap reflect both  individual  and  relational
welfare. Given this balanced emphasis on both individual and social or relational returns,
the actual achievements of village level local institutions become more clear. Following
are the main findings:
*  A higher level of village intemal organization is linked to lower inequality and lower
poverty in the communities.
*  Highly  organized  villages  are  associated  with  much  higher  growth  elasticity,
indicating a faster poverty reduction in the near future.
*  Service-assets-management groups (SAMs) are linked to lower inequality among LLI
participating households.
•  A higher level of village organization is linked to a lower possibility of being poor, a
smaller  poverty  gap,  and  a  moderately  higher  expenditure  per  capita  for  the
households living in the villages.
•  Based on the regression results, local institutions contribute to the well-being of all
households in the community, who may or may not have memberships in SAMs or
other LLI groups.
This  evidence  reveals  an  emerging  development  institution  in  Africa  that
simultaneously incorporates growth and  lowers inequality. Past experience  has shown
that  reasonably distributed wealth/income in a society is a basis  for sustained  growth.
And the achievements of LL/SAM  in Burkina Faso have confirmed a real capacity to
eradicate  poverty  in Africa by managing  an inclusive growth pattern, named, for  the
purpose of this study, "relational growth."
325.  CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The  LLI  action-research  study  finds  strong, even  extraordinary,  evidence  of  the
efficacy of local level institutions and their capacity to reduce poverty. Of the three active
local  level  institutions  identified  in  the  LLI  study,  service  asset  management
organizations  (SAMs)  prompted the  most  effective  community-driven  development.
Qualitatively,  it was found that these high performing SAMs/LLIs brought about more
equitable growth among communities. At the same time, the quantitative analysis shows
that LLI/SAMs are linked to lower inequality among LLI participating households at a
statistically significant 95 percent level.
This means that, where they exist, LLI/SAMs have launched communities on a more
equitable growth path and, without assistance, are reducing poverty-  despite their severe
resource constraints. In addition, while this study has focused on Burkina Faso, the very
structure of these  high  performing  LLI/SAMs means that they  can  exist  across  any
number of African countries. This is because they depend upon internalized participation
rather than specific cultural structures.
Clearly, if external development aid resources can be added to this  already robust
internal initiative, the future impact on poverty reduction can be enormous. But if outside
agencies expect to be successful in establishing alliances with LLI/SAMs, they must first
recognize the unorthodox nature of these institutions.
Key operational  implication
LLI/SAMs take a critically different approach on how to achieve poverty reduction.
Current  Western-oriented  poverty  reduction models  automatically  use growth  as the
initiator,  with  redistribution and  equity  as the  result. LLI/SAMs,  on  the  other  hand,
reorder things to match their values and resource strengths. LLI/SAMs thus see equity as
the initiator, with poverty reduction and growth as the result. In addition to the utilitarian
focus routinely accepted in Western growth and poverty reduction models, the Burkinabe
have developed an innovative relational focus that complements and expands utilitarian
growth factors.
In order to support LLI/SAMs, the World Bank will have to shift perspectives and
also see equity as an initiator rather than just an outcome of growth. Recent institutional
changes  in  the  Bank-Comprehensive  Development  Framework  (CDF),  Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), and Community Driven Development (CDD)-are  a
basis for this re-negotiation of terms to reduce poverty. The following recommendations
detail workable program and policy packages to employ LLI operational initiatives.
Recommendations  for an LLI-based  program  package
The following four initiatives offer an operational framework for effective, internally
driven development.
*  Start with LLI institutional mapping to guide pro-poor investment.  As decisions are
made to  move away from supply-side, sectoral-driven, investment interventions to
more  demand-driven  multi-sector  initiatives,  there  must  be  another  type  of
investment  guide which  is useful to  both  local  government and  external  donors.
Mapping  of  local  level  institutions  is  the  necessary  first  step  for  effective and
internalized  pro-poor  investment.  This  mapping  points  to  where  LLI/SAMs  are
strong and  working  to  reduce  poverty,  and  where  they  are weak,  exclusive,  or
33ineffective  for  poverty reduction with  resulting high  inequalities  of development.
With this mapping in hand, both internal and external development organizations can
complement and support sustainable and equitable community driven development.
*  Use  LLI  mapping  to formalize  participation  and  scale-up  local  institutions.
LLI/SAMs' own internally anchored participation approach is critical to their success
in poverty eradication. But 'participatory problem diagnosis'  is only the first step in
this approach. The second step, rarely recognized externally, encourages local groups
to renegotiate power alignments and make internal institutional revisions so that the
problems diagnosed can be solved.  LLI mapping explicitly recognizes this capacity
and encourages local governments to formalize relations with local level institutions
in a manner  which allows them to make effective contributions to these necessary
institutional  revisions.  LLI  mapping  also  allows local  level  institutions---once
formally  recognized  by  local  governments---to  strengthen  their  own  scaling-up
capacity.
*  Use LLI  mapping to guide financing for  community driven development  (CDD).
Current  community  driven  development  and  rural  decentralization  programs
recognize the severe resource constraints facing rural communities. But they make a
mistake when they fund communities without regard to the surrounding local level
institutions.  By doing so, they bypass the institutions that are actually responsible for
creating  local  accountability  and  transparency.  Basing  CDD  and  rural
decentralization  within the  LLI  context  however, allows  these  new  programs  to
mature and scale-up within an established internal landscape that takes advantage of
already existing trusted accountability mechanisms.
In sum, this proposed program packageformalizes the operational recognition of LLIs
and  locally  anchored participation.  This  in turn  creates  a  base  for  the  expansion  of
poverty reducing LLI/SAMs and more effective rural decentralization. It also spells out
the base through which  internal and external resources can work together. Too  often,
there  is a  false assumption of having to  choose between working with  indigenous or
transplanted  western  institutions. A  strategic mix of institutional  supply  and  demand
tactics will allow multi-sector poverty reduction and equitable growth to emerge at the
local level.
Recommendations  for an LLI-based  policy  package
The following two policy initiatives will provide an effective macro policy framework
to reduce poverty and enhance growth.
*  Working from  LLI  results,  create  national policies  that favor  development  of
indigenously based, but ecxternally  oriented local economies. LLI results show that
a  balanced  mix  of  different  kinds  of  LLIs/SAMs  brings  a  more  inclusive
development that values both individual (utilitarian) and social (relational)  returns.
So far, however, there is no place to demonstrate how these internal LLI capacities
can reduce poverty and enhance growth. The missing link in national development is
the formal recognition of indigenously based, inclusive local economies that respond
well to external market competition. Currently, the focus remains on the small formal
economy enclave in each country, defining policies of trade, privatization, labor, and
foreign investment that ignore societal values and therefore fail to pay off.  However,
if poverty  reduction and growth enhancement initiatives are to be taken seriously,
local economies--and the policies  to support them--must be formalized  within their
34own cultural framework.  With this,  there  must be a  commitment to  scale-up  the
considerable  LLI/SAM  organizational  resources  available  to  create  equitable
development.
Working from  LLI  results, link PRSP  strategies to LLI/SAMs  for  accountability
and  transparency. In order to  engage civil  society in national  poverty  reduction
monitoring, credibility will be critical.  LLI/SAM's  have a proven track  record in
providing  equitable  development  that  is accountable and  transparent  at  the  local
level, and this capacity can be tapped into and connected to national level initiatives.
To achieve this localization at the national level, the LLI/SAM concept of balancing
both individual utilitarian and relational orientations for culturally credible economic
and social development must be expanded. With this macro-micro linkage in place,
each society can create an accountable policy template that reflects its own balance
between  complementary  utilitarian  and  relational  growth/poverty  reduction
strategies.
Working principles
Working from  the  recommendations outlined in this  section,  four  simple  guiding
principles emerge. These principles will allow Burkina Faso and other countries involved
in  rural  decentralization  initiatives to  build  on  their  institutional  resources  and  have
development alliances to expand them. These same principles will allow Bank teams to
support poverty reduction and growth enhancement in rural areas. The principles are as
follows:
•  Enough LLI capacity exists for the  government and outside  agencies  to build  on
internal and locally planned development initiatives and processes.
•  Culturally and internally anchored participation must be theformalized  base for this
partner-based rural development and rural decentralization to expand.
*  Local  level  institutions  should be the  key unit of analysis, while  the  community
remains the key focus for action and impact.
- National  development templates that  balance the LLI relational factors  of poverty
reduction with more established utilitarian  growth strategies should be developed.
This links macro and micro and builds on societal resources.
If LLI results  concerning poverty reduction and equitable growth enhancement  are
disseminated  to  all  parties -including  local  communities  and  donor  organizations
-internal  capacity expansion throughout the country should be swift  and sure. As a
result, African rural decentralization models across the Continentcan  be re-invented to
use the  indigenous strengths of local level institutions and  their values  of equity and
solidarity. LLI results  reveal that  the Burkinab6 and most  likely many other  African
countries have already begun to initiate their own brand of institutional transformation.
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